

Message Text

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ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

NSC-05 SP-02 L-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 PRS-01 DODE-00 NEA-07

EUR-08 /053 W

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O R 200750Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 809

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 12778

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR INGA KS KN ID

SUBJ: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA

REF: A. JAKARTA 12742 B. STATE 246947

1. SUMMARY: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO CONFIRMS THAT INDONESIA CONTINUING TO COUNT OF VICTORY FOR CANADIAN/FRENCH RESOLUTION AND RELUCTANT FACE UP TO POSSIBLE NEGATIVE VOTE ON NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. I SAW PRESIDENT SUHARTO OCTOBER 20 AND INFORMED HIM THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS RAISE QUESTION OF KOREA WITH HIM BECAUSE OF OUR STRONG FEELING THIS CONSTITUTED ISSUE RELATED TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA WHICH TRANSCENDED NORMAL UN CONSIDERATIONS. WHILE WE WELCOMED
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INDONESIAN DECISION TO DEFEND PRIORITY FOR AND TO VOTE

FOR CANADIAN/FRENCH RESOLUTION, WE STILL EXPECTED STRONG EFFORT TO BE MADE, REGARDLESS, TO BRING NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION TO VOTE. NORTH KOREA WAS AGGRESSIVE POWER WHICH COULD ONLY BE ENCOURAGED BY SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY IN UN. KOREAN PENINSULA WAS DANGER POINT, CONFLICT THERE COULD AFFECT ALL OF ASIA AND PARTICULARLY JAPAN. NORTH KOREA WAS SEEKING REMOVE SECURITY UMBRELLA AND ISOLATE SOUTH KOREA. WE BELIEVE THOSE CONCERNS SHOULD TRANSCEND NORMAL CONSIDERATION OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN UN POLITICS AND STRONGLY HOPE THAT IF NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION COMES TO VOTE, INDONESIA AND OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES WILL VOTE AGAINST IT.

3. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT INDONESIA IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION BUT UNDERSTANDS THAT CANADIAN RESOLUTION AS AMENDED HAS CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE AND INDONESIA WILL VOTE FOR IT. HE SAID I WAS CORRECT IN CITING PROBLEM OF NONALIGNMENT RELATIONSHIP. NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAVE ENDORSED NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION AND THIS WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR INDONESIA TO VOTE AGAINST IT.

4. I SAID WE APPRECIATED DIFFICULTY BUT BELIEVED THAT PERHAPS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CLOSER TO HOME SHOULD PREVAIL. I SAID THAT EVENTS COULD MOVE QUICKLY IN NEW YORK AND WE MIGHT ALL BE FACED WITH UNPLEASANT DILEMMA OF VOTE ON NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. WE ATTACHED MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE AND HOPED THAT OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA WOULD THINK VERY SERIOUSLY REGARDING CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL NORTH KOREAN EFFORT. I SAID I HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK AND THAT I TOLD MALIK I WOULD BE KNOCKING ON HIS DOOR AGAIN IF IT LOOKED AS IF NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION WOULD ACTUALLY COME TO VOTE.

5. PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SERIOUSNESS OF MATTER AND THAT HE WAS CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES. HE AGREED THAT I SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MALIK.

6. COMMENT: IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH MALIK AND
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PRESIDENT I HAVE NOT SUGGESTED (AS PROPOSED REF B) THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND INDONESIAN ABSTENTION ON CANADIAN/FRENCH RESOLUTION. WE HAVE INDONESIAN SUPPORT ON THIS AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD KEEP THEIR FEET TO FIRE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THEY SEE ABSTENTION ON CANADIAN RESOLUTION AS ALTERNATIVE TO UNPLEASANT PROSPECT OF NEGATIVE VOTE ON NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION. CERTAINLY ONE KEY TO THEIR ACTION IS WHAT OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES WILL DO. STRONG

JAPANESE POSITION WOULD ALSO HELP BUT WE HAVE NOT YET
SEEN ANY CLEAR EVIDENCE OF SUCH HERE. AS EVENTS MAY
UNFOLD IN NEW YORK--PROBABLY RAPIDLY--IT IS VERY IMPORTANT
KEEP IN TOUCH WITH GOI AMBASSADOR SANI AND TO GIVE US
HERE AS MUCH NOTICE AS POSSIBLE WHEN IT APPEARS VOTE ON
NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION IS INESCAPABLE. NEWSOM

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, UNGA RESOLUTIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MEETING VOTING RECORDS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: izenbei0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975JAKART12778
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750363-0270
From: JAKARTA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751038/aaaabhsj.tel
Line Count: 121
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 75 JAKARTA 12742, 75 STATE 246947
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: izenbei0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 JUL 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <17 NOV 2003 by izenbei0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA
TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN, ID, US, UNGA, (MALIK, ADAM), (NEWSOM, DAVID D), (SUHARTO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006